Auctioning Conservation Contracts: A Theoretical Analysis and an Application
用拍卖理论分析乡村非市场物品合同分配中拍卖的潜在收益，建立保护合同最优投标模型，发现竞争性投标相比固定支付能显著提高成本效益，并揭示投标过程的信息揭示机制可减少信息不对称问题。
Abstract Auction theory is used to analyze the potential benefits of auctions in allocating contracts for the provision of nonmarket goods in the countryside. A model of optimal bidding for conservation contracts is developed and applied to a hypothetical conservation program. Competitive bidding, compared to fixed‐rate payments, can increase the cost effectiveness of conservation contracting significantly. The cost revelation mechanism inherent in the bidding process makes auctions a powerful means by which to reduce the problems of information asymmetry. Strategic bidding behavior, which may adversely affect the performance of sequential auctions, is difficult to address by means of auction design.