Market Power and Transferable Property Rights
分析企业在可转让产权市场中如何利用市场势力，并建立模型解释单一企业如何施加影响，最后以洛杉矶地区硫酸盐颗粒物控制为案例进行检验。
The appeal of using markets as a means of allocating scarce resources stems in large part from the assumption that a market will approximate the competitive ideal. When competition is not a foregone conclusion, the question naturally arises as to how a firm might manipulate the market to its own advantage. This paper analyzes the issue of market power in the context of markets for transferable property rights. First, a model is developed that explains how a single firm with market power might exercise its influence. This is followed by an examination of the model in the context of a particular policy problem--the control of particulate sulfates in the Los Angeles region.