Seigniorage, Taxation, and Weak Government
研究政府支出融资决策分散化时，铸币税作为被动调节的剩余税种，在重复博弈框架下得出铸币税与产出波动正相关、与趋势增长负相关的结论，并用20个OECD国家年度数据和75国截面数据验证。
We examined a setting where decision making about financing a given amount of government spending is decentralized. Seigniorage is the residual tax that passively adjusts to meet the budget constraint. We place this budget making process in a repeated game setting and characterize the cooperative tax-seigniorage function. Three main results are (1) Seignioiage and transitory changes in output are positively correlated. This result holds after controlling for changes in government spending. (2) A positive (negative) covariation between current period government spending and transitory output strengthens (weakens) the positive relationship between seigniorage and transitory output. (3) Seigniorage is negatively correlated with trend output growth. Time series empirical tests using annual data for 20 OECD countries support the first two results. A test using cross-section data on 75 countries confirms the third hypothesis. Copyright 1997 by Ohio State University Press.