Nonprofit and Proprietary Sector Behavior: Wage Differentials among Lawyers
估计了私人律师的收入方程，预测非营利部门“公益律师”在私营部门的潜在收入，发现他们收入明显更低且知道这一永久性牺牲，并通过工作选择方程揭示偏好差异。
This paper focuses on earnings differentials in the for-profit and private nonprofit sectors, with specific reference to lawyers. An earnings equation for private lawyers is estimated and is used to predict what the nonprofit sector "public interest" lawyers could earn in the private sector. The finding is that the public interest lawyers are paid substantially less, that they know this, and that the financial sacrifice is permanent. Next, a job choice equation is estimated which suggests that those lawyers who choose public interest work have different "preferences" from those who choose private law practices. The difference may help to account for the willingness of the public interest lawyers to accept lower monetary rewards. Further research is needed to determine whether the differences found for lawyers in the two sectors are also found in other industries, and whether such differences are found only at the level of management or at lower levels. The goal is improved understanding of behavioral differences between for-profit and nonprofit firms.