Tender Mercies: Efficient and Equitable Land use Change
提出一个双层前端招标系统，通过建立部分产权市场替代政府分区，消除分区制度的低效与不公，促进开发并补偿负外部性受害者。
A two‐tiered, front‐end‐loaded tender offer system is shown to catalyze a market for partial property rights. This market would obviate any legitimate need for governmental zoning, and thus would put an end to zoning's inefficiency and inequity. The proposed system would facilitate development and redevelopment, cause nuisance producing zones to become more compact, stop the subversion of zoning for fiscal and exclusionary purposes, reduce the opportunities for corruption and end rent seeking as well as “not in my backyard” activities. The proposed tender offer system would fully compensate those who are injured by negative externalities, thereby eliminating adverse distributional effects.