Insiders, Outsiders, and Nominal Wage Contracts
提出内部人与外部人的区分对理解名义工资合同为何普遍存在很重要，因为内部人不受就业波动影响，且需求冲击对实际工资影响小，故内部人缺乏改用更复杂合同的激励。
While the consequences of nominal wage contracts have been rather thoroughly analyzed, there is no generally accepted theory of why such contracts prevail. In this paper, the author argues that the distinction between insiders and outsiders is important for understanding nominal wage contracts. Since most employment fluctuations take the form of fluctuations in hiring, insiders are normally not affected by them. Since prices are primarily determined by costs, demand shocks have small effects on real wages. Thus, insiders have little incentive to change to more complicated contracts. With rigid nominal wages, nominal demand shocks have large effects on the employment opportunities of outsiders. Copyright 1992 by University of Chicago Press.