COLLUSION AND FIGHTS IN AN EXPERIMENT WITH PRICE‐SETTING FIRMS AND ADVANCE PRODUCTION*
通过50轮双寡头和三寡头实验，研究企业同时决定价格和产量时的市场演化，发现市场要么因破产演变为垄断，要么在垄断价格上合谋，且三家企业市场平均价格更低但效率也更低。
We present results from 50‐round duopoly and triopoly experiments. Firms decide repeatedly both on price and quantity of a perishable good. Each firm has capacity to serve the whole market. The stage game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. Most markets evolve either to monopolies as a consequence of bankruptcies or to collusion at the monopolistic price. Evolution is faster in markets with two than in those with three firms. Therefore, over time average price is lower with three than with two. Consumer surplus is higher with three firms, but efficiency is lower in markets with three firms.