Equilibrium and Optimal Size of a Research Joint Venture in an Oligopoly with Spillovers
分析了一个存在信息溢出的寡头模型，发现市场对合作研发的激励不足，均衡的研究合资企业规模通常小于最优规模（即所有企业参与），因此政策应鼓励高科技行业企业形成全行业合作协议。
This paper analyzes a simple oligopoly model with information spillovers. Firms spend on R&D to affect their costs of production. The main finding is that, depending on the magnitude of the spillover, the market may not provide enough incentives for the optimum degree of cooperation to take place. It is shown that the equilibrium size of a research joint venture is usually less than the optimum size, which requires all firms to participate in the research joint venture. The policy implications of this result are that there should be encouragement for firms competing in high-technology industries to form industry-wide cooperative agreements. Copyright 1995 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.