Insider Trading and the Managerial Choice among Risky Projects
研究内幕交易如何影响管理者在投资项目间的选择，发现内幕交易会促使管理者选择风险更高的项目，但这一效应可能因管理者的风险规避而有益，并分析了内幕交易通过影响项目选择提升或降低公司价值的条件。
The concern of this paper is with the effects of insider trading on ex ante managerial behavior.Specifically, the paper focuses on how insider trading affects insiders' choice among investment projects.Other things equal, insider trading leads insiders to choose riskier investment projects, because increased volatility of results enables insiders to make greater trading profits if they learn these results in advance of the market.This effect might be beneficial, however, because insiders' risk aversion pulls them toward a conservative investment policy.Insiders' choices of projects are identified and compared with insider trading and those without such trading.Using these results, the conditions under which insider trading increases or decreases corporate value by affecting the choice of projects with uncertain returns are identified.