敌意收购公告前知情交易的竞标者激励

Bidder Incentives for Informed Trading before Hostile Tender Offer Announcements

Financial Management · 1994
被引 5
人大 A-ABS 3

中文导读

分析法律要求披露收购前必须披露报价,这促使竞标者在公告前向套利者泄露信息,因为套利者私人投标成本更低,能降低最低成功收购价,增加竞标者利润。

Abstract

Legal constraints that require disclosure of a bid before a controlling interest is purchased give bidders an incentive to tip arbitrageurs before announcement. Because arbitrageurs are likely to have lower private tendering costs than other shareholders, tipping decreases the minimum successful bid price, which increases profits to the bidder. The incentive to leak information is negatively related to the amount of dilution the bidder anticipates, the degree to which the back-end price embeds any pre-announcement price increase arising from additional trading by arbitrageurs, and the size of the bidder's toehold. It is positively related to the private tendering costs of the pivotal share.

敌意收购内幕交易套利者信息披露投标人激励