MODELS OF BANKING INSTABILITY: A PARTIAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
批判性回顾了Diamond和Dybvig（1983）之后的银行不稳定理论文献，探讨其是否在金融中介改善市场的背景下解释银行不稳定，以及是否为政府干预提供合理依据。结论是文献尚未提供令人满意的理论基础，且干预论点存在矛盾。
Abstract. This paper critically examines the theoretical literature on banking instability that has followed Diamond and Dybvig (1983). It explores the extent to which it (a) explains banking instability within a theoretical context in which financial intermediaries improve on unintermediated markets, and (b) justifies government involvement in the financial intermediation industry. It suggests that the literature has yet to provide a satisfactory theoretical basis for banking instability as such since the intermediaries which arise from it are peculiar mutual funds that bear little resemblance to real‐world banks. In addition, the paper challenges the widespread belief that this literature provides a sound foundation for government involvement in the industry. It suggests that arguments for government intervention are open to objection on various grounds, the most important one being that they are inconsistent with the existence of properly motivated financial intermediation in these models.