Auditor Reputation Building
通过实验经济学研究审计师声誉构建，发现声誉形成的关键条件是采用声誉策略的奖励是否即时；即时奖励下声誉在所有实验轮次中形成，延迟奖励下则不足一半。
This paper reports the results of an experimental economics study designed to examine reputation building by information verifiers (auditors). The results identify boundary conditions to reputation formation and supply insight into auditors’ incentives to form reputations. Reputations form in all sessions of treatments that supply nearly immediate rewards to participants who adopt reputation equilibrium strategies. In contrast, reputations form in less than half of the sessions of a treatment where participants have to maintain reputation equilibrium strategies for number of periods before the market rewards their effort. The results suggest the immediacy of rewards for adopting reputation strategies is a critical determinant of reputation formation.