Noncontrollable Costs and Optimal Performance Measurement
探讨在序贯部门设置中，为何将看似不可控的成本分配给最终部门可能是最优的，并补充了Suh[1987]未考虑的两种机制：有噪音的质量生成过程和中间部门经理的私人信息。
Suh [1987] addresses the issue of why it could be optimal to allocate apparently noncontrollable costs for management control purposes in a multiagent, sequential department setting.' He shows that there are situations in which a final division manager has an incentive to collude with an intermediate division manager to get a higher quality of intermediate product than the principal desires. In this case, it could be optimal for the principal to hold the final division manager responsible for those noncontrollable intermediate costs by allocating those costs to the final division, if the principal dislikes their collusion. The purpose of this paper is to show that two other mechanisms (a noisy qualitygenerating process and intermediate division manager's private information), which are not considered in Suh [1987], could also explain noncontrollable cost allocation in a sequential department setting. These two mechanisms are discussed in sections 2 and 3, respectively.