Evolving Aspirations and Cooperation
研究两个满意型玩家重复进行2×2博弈，包括囚徒困境、协调博弈和共同利益博弈。玩家根据抱负调整行动，抱负随收益更新并偶尔受扰动。结果显示，在抱负更新慢且扰动概率低时，双方最终大部分时间会合作。
A 2×2 game is played repeatedly by two satisficing players. The game considered includes the Prisoner's Dilemma, as well as games of coordination and common interest. Each player has anaspirationat each date, and takes an action. The action is switched at the subsequent period only if the achieved payoff falls below aspirations; the switching probability depends on the shortfall. Aspirations are periodically updated according to payoff experience, but are occasionally subject to trembles. For sufficiently slow updating of aspirations and small tremble probability, it is shown that both players must ultimately cooperate most of the time.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers C72, D83.