How Communication Links Influence Coalition Bargaining: A Laboratory Investigation
通过实验室实验，研究三人联盟谈判中沟通结构（谁可以和谁沟通）如何影响结果，发现限制沟通会改变结果，且弱势方在受限结构中更有利，强势方在公开结构中更有利。
Complexity of communication is one of the important factors that distinguishes multilateral negotiation from its bilateral cousin. We investigate how the communication configuration affects a three-person coalition negotiation. Restricting who can communicate with whom strongly influences outcomes, and not always in ways that current theory anticipates. Competitive frictions, including a tendency to communicate offers privately, appear to shape much of what we observe. Our results suggest that parties with weaker alternatives would benefit from a more constrained structure, especially if they can be the conduit of communication, while those endowed with stronger alternatives would do well to work within a more public communication structure that promotes competitive bidding.