Auctioning the Provision of an Indivisible Public Good
研究一个社区如何通过拍卖机制选择成本最低的成员来提供不可分割的公共物品，设计了一类类似“第k低报价”拍卖的机制，并证明其能实现纳什均衡。
A "community" of n agents must determine which of its members should provide an indivisible public good. Each of the agents can provide the public good, but the provision cost varies among the agents. We identify here an efficient solution concept for such problems and design a class of auction-like mechanisms, each of which Nash implements (and under appropriate domain restrictions fully Nash implements) this. The mechanisms are in the spirit of "k th lowest bidder" auctions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D44, H41.