The Auction of Redemptioner Servants, Philadelphia, 1771–1804: An Economic Analysis
研究了美国赎身制度下移民仆役拍卖的运作机制，发现竞争克服了搜索限制，使仆役平均报酬与自由劳工相当，且报酬差异与生产力、合同限制和工作条件相关。
The redemption system transformed the American auction of immigrant servants. The potential for exploiting immigrants was created by search restrictions in the redemption auction. A model of the auction was estimated using 4,455 German and British servant contracts. Average servant compensation equaled resident free labor compensation, and the variance in servant compensation was systematically related to the variance in servant productivity, contract restrictions, and work amenities. Competition among buyers overcame the search restrictions placed on immigrants in the redemption auction.