Tripartite Income-Employment Contracts and Coalition Incentive Compatibility
研究工人、企业和保险经纪人之间的三方合同，发现其优于双边合同但易被联盟操纵，进而定义并刻画了联盟激励相容的三方合同，并分析了经纪人中介在何种条件下仍能改善福利。
Tripartite contracts between workers, a firm, and an insurance broker Pareto dominate the usual bilateral arrangements if coalitions are not feasible. They do this by allowing the broker to run surpluses over a reservation expected utility in some states and deficits in others. We show that these contracts are manipulable by coalitions. This motivates our main contribution -- the definition and characterization of coalition incentive compatible tripartite contracts. We then ask whether broker intermediation can still be useful. The answer is that not every coalition incentive compatibility requirement annuls the critical budget-breaking property. Specifically, if firm-broker coalitions are feasible, there is no three-party contract that is coalition incentive compatible and Pareto superior to bilateral firm-worker contracts, except in the extreme case where the workers' demand for leisure is income inelastic But if only a firm-worker coalition can form, the addition of a broker to a bilateral arrangement does reduce the welfare losses caused by the existence of asymmetric information.