THE ECONOMICS OF TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE
综述了关于个人为何逃税以及政府应如何减少逃税的研究，发现逃税成本巨大，理论预测困难，实证研究有缺陷，政策设计存在争议。
Abstract. There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that tax evasion is now fairly extensive throughout Western Europe and North America. Academic economists have shown considerable interest in various aspects of tax evasion. In this article we examine the literature on two particular issues. First, why do individuals evade their tax obligations and second, what policies should governments pursue in attempting to reduce or eliminate evasion? We concentrate on income tax evasion which has been the major preoccupation in the literature. We first show that the compliance costs of income tax evasion are quite substantial. We then examine theoretical attempts to model individual taxpayers behaviour. Here we find that it is extremely difficult to make unambiguous predictions concerning the effects of changes in important variables, such as income tax rates. Next, we review the empirical ‘evidence’ obtained from (i) attitudinal surveys, (ii) tax games, and (iii) econometric analysis of individuals’ tax returns. All of these studies are found to be flawed in certain major respects. Finally, we consider a number of policy options available to tax authorities. Given the difficulty of determining a socially optimal level of evasion, governments are likely to pursue suboptimal policies aimed at entirely eliminating tax evasion. However, even here there is considerable disagreement about the design of an efficient policy.