创新、模仿与经济增长

Innovation, Imitation, and Economic Growth

Journal of Political Economy · 1991
被引 478
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

构建了一个动态一般均衡模型,其中创新和模仿率由企业间的研发竞赛内生决定,并分析了创新补贴对经济增长和福利的影响。

Abstract

This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model of economic growth. The model has a steady-state equilibrium in which some firms devote resources to copying these products. Rates of both innovation and imitation are endogenously determined on the basis of the outcomes of R&D races between firms. Innovation subsidies are shown to unambiguously promote economic growth. Welfare is enhanced, however, only if the steady-state intensity of innovative effort exceeds a critical level. Copyright 1991 by University of Chicago Press.

创新模仿经济增长研发竞赛