Stability of Functional Rational Expectations Equilibria
研究代表性代理人预测价格的学习过程，发现中间阶段学习不收敛于理性预期均衡，而两阶段学习则收敛，对理解经济均衡的稳定性有参考价值。
In this paper we examine a representative agent forecasting prices in a first-order self-referential overlapping generations model. We first consider intermediate stage learning, where agents update the forecasting rule every m periods. We show that, in theory and simulations, the learning rule does not converge to the rational expectations equilibrium (REE). We next consider two stage learning, where agents learn the functional mapping between the current forecast function and the previous forecast function. We show that in theory and simulations the two stage learning rule converges to the REE. Journal of Economic Literature Classifications Numbers: C62, C63, D83.