斯塔克尔伯格与古诺双寡头:角色选择

von Stackelberg and Cournot Duopoly: Choosing Roles

RAND Journal of Economics · 1986
被引 251
人大 AFT50ABS 4

中文导读

分析在斯塔克尔伯格双寡头模型中,企业何时会就领导者与追随者的角色选择达成一致,关键取决于企业反应函数的斜率。

Abstract

Under what circumstances will firms agree on the choice of roles of leader and follower in the von Stackelberg duopoly model? A key determinant is the slope of the firms' reaction function (in either price or quantity space). The duopolists will disagree over the choice of roles if they have downward-sloping reaction functions. Each will prefer to be the leader. They will also disagree if they have upward-sloping reaction functions and similar profit functions. Each will prefer that the other be the leader. Preferences between von Stackelberg and Cournot outcomes are also considered.

斯塔克尔伯格模型古诺模型反应函数斜率领导者选择