Dynamic Contractual Enforcement: A Model of Strikes
提出一个理论，将罢工视为隐性契约的约束有效执行机制。企业拥有关于需求的私人信息，若工人观察完美则罢工不会发生，若观察不完美则罢工在均衡中出现，并导致生产低效和不完全保险。
This paper provides a theory of strikes as part of a constrained efficient enforcement mechanism for an implicit contractual agreement. A firm possessing contemporaneously private information about demand engages in an enduring relationship with its workforce. If the information becomes perfectly observable subsequently, then, modulo discounting, the first‐best is implementable, but strikes are always off the equilibrium path. If the observations of the workforce are imperfect strikes occur in equilibrium. The dynamic contracting problem is modeled as a repeated game with imperfect monitoring. The equilibrium exhibits production inefficiency and incomplete insurance to mitigate the inefficiencies caused by strikes.