Is Public Spending Determined by Voter Choice of Fiscal Capacity?
提出一个切换机制模型，解释为何高通胀在国家间非随机分布：当选民选择的支出水平超过实际收入能力时，政府倾向于通过通胀性债务货币化来融资。基于1970、1975和1980年跨国数据，发现选民选择模型适用于多数工业化国家，而财政能力约束则适用于多数发展中国家。
Previous models of public spending fail to explain why high inflation rates are distributed non-randomly across countries. In the switching-regime specification proposed here, governments tend to resort to inflationary debt monetarization when the spending level chosen by voters exceeds actual revenue capacity. The voter-choice and fiscal-capacity models of earlier studies are special cases of this framework. Using cross country data for 1970, 1975 and 1980, the authors find that the voter-choice specification applies to most industrialized countries, whereas fiscal capacity appears to constrain government spending in most developing countries. High inflation appears to result from shocks that alter a country's fiscal capacity relative to voters' expectations. Copyright 1992 by MIT Press.