当预算虚报扭曲资源分配时的项目分配

Project Assignments When Budget Padding Taints Resource Allocation

Management Science · 2006
被引 12
人大 A+FT50UTD24ABS 4*

中文导读

研究轮岗制度如何应对员工预算虚报问题,通过分散信息优势来优化资源分配,并比较了轮岗与专业化分配的优劣。

Abstract

This paper shows that rotation programs can be an effective response to concerns of employee budget padding. Rotation programs naturally create a “portfolio” of assignments for each manager, and the resulting diversification can reduce the downside of resource rationing. In particular, the production versus rents trade-off linked with adverse selection problems can be more efficiently carried out when the firm faces two managers with average information advantages, rather than one with a large advantage and one with a small advantage. Roughly stated, rotation of project assignments is a way of smoothing information across managers. On the other hand, if a firm places a premium on treating different types of projects in distinct ways, specialized assignments can be preferred due to the ability to confine project types to individual managers.

预算虚报资源分配轮岗制度信息平滑