Cost Manipulation Games in Oligopoly, With Costs of Manipulating
分析了两阶段博弈，其中竞争企业通过消耗实际资源来操纵边际成本，以影响后续博弈结果。研究发现，即使事前对称的企业，其最优资源分配也可能不对称，为寡头垄断中的异质性提供了新解释。
We analyze a class of two‐stage games where rival firms incur real resource costs in manipulating their marginal costs, so as to influence the outcome of the game they want to play in stage two. Marginal costs may be manipulated by various means, such as redistribution of productive assets, choice of location, or creation of an internal input market. A general formulation of the game is provided, and several applications are analyzed. We show that the optimal allocation of resources within an oligopoly can be asymmetric, even for ex‐ante symmetric firms. This is an additional explanation of heterogeneity in oligopoly.