Machinery‐sharing in the presence of strategic uncertainty: evidence from Sweden
结合人格测量、博弈论和社会经济问卷，研究瑞典农民在农机共享合作中的战略不确定性，发现对模糊的不容忍显著影响合作策略，而概率不确定性厌恶无解释力。
Abstract Interpersonal choices related to machinery‐sharing collaborations between farmers in the presence of strategic uncertainty were examined by combining personality measures, game theory, and socioeconomic questionnaire results to empirically analyze the formation of voluntary cooperation in collaborations relating to farm machinery. It was found that aversion to probabilistic uncertainty referring to the Ellsberg paradox had no explanatory power. Intolerance of ambiguity as a personal trait proved to be a significant variable explaining collaborative strategies, whereas fear of negative evaluation by others did not significantly affect the choices made. In the repeated game context, the time taken to converge from limited to full collaboration was longer than that needed to dissolve the full collaboration owing to deviating behavior of the other party. These results can be used in developing richer, descriptive, fertile models that explain the formation of more viable farm business structures.