Splitting the Baby: An Empirical Test of Rules of Thumb in Regulatory Price Setting
实证评估了美国1996年电信法下本地电话公司网络元件定价，发现成本是主要决定因素，但价格也反映了对在位企业零售利润的补偿，统计检验表明公共机构行为符合“折中”经验法则。
Summary This article provides an empirical evaluation of a recent and important exercise in regulatory price setting in the United States. The 1996 Telecommunications Act required incumbent local phone companies to sell components of their network to rival firms at regulated prices, and the prices for these ‘unbundled network elements’ were based primarily on independent estimates of forward‐looking economic costs. Our econometric analysis reveals that, while cost is a primary determinant of element prices, the prices also reflect foregone retail profits for incumbent firms. Statistical tests suggest that ‘splitting the baby’ is an accurate positivist description of public agency behavior.