Do Credit Markets Discipline Sovereign Borrowers? Evidence from U.S. States
通过估计美国各州面临的债务供给曲线，检验信贷市场对主权借款人的约束力。结果显示，市场能提供激励抑制过度借贷，且债务越高，风险溢价上升越明显，甚至可能切断信贷渠道。
The degree to which credit markets discipline sovereign borrowers is investigated by estimating the supply curve for debt faced by U.S. states. The results generally support an optimistic view of the market discipline hypothesis, with credit markets providing incentives for sovereign borrowers to restrain borrowing. While the risk premium on bond yields is estimated to increase only gradually at low levels of debt, this effect appears to become much larger as debt rises. There is also some evidence that credit markets may withhold access to credit at very high levels of debt. Copyright 1995 by Ohio State University Press.