Cooperation without coordination: signaling, types and tacit collusion in laboratory oligopolies
通过实验室实验研究价格信号活动和合作倾向对默契合谋的影响，发现信号数量与合谋效率无关，而卖方的合作倾向更显著影响合谋程度。
Abstract We study the effects of price signaling activity and underlying propensities to cooperate on tacit collusion in posted offer markets. The primary experiment consists of an extensively repeated baseline sequence and a ‘forecast’ sequence that adds to the baseline a forecasting game that allows identification of signaling intentions. Forecast sequence results indicate that signaling intentions differ considerably from those that are counted under a standard signal measure based on previous period prices. Nevertheless, we find essentially no correlation between either measure of signal volumes and collusive efficiency. A second experiment demonstrates that underlying seller propensities to cooperate more clearly affect collusiveness.