The Social Efficiency of Fixed Wages
分析了一个模型，其中固定工资和裁员可能是组织雇佣合同的最有效方式。当工资波动导致劳动力在企业间重新配置时，工人需做出昂贵决策并可能过度搜寻；而固定工资合同下，只有被裁工人需要决策，其较低的决策成本可能超过失业的资源成本。
This paper analyzes a model in which fixed wages and layoffs may be the most efficient way to organize employment contracts. When wages fluctuate to reallocate labor among firms, workers must make costly decisions and may undertake excessive search. In contrast, if all firms reallocate labor with layoffs and new hires at fixed wages, only those workers laid off will have decisions to make. The lower decision costs of the fixed wage contract may more than compensate for the resource cost of the unemployment it causes. A novel feature of the model is the result that the socially optimal contract, when chosen by all firms, may not be the privately optimal contract.