State-Contingent Inflation Contracts and Unemployment Persistence
证明，当失业遵循动态自回归过程时，政府可通过向央行提供线性通胀合约（其中通胀惩罚随滞后失业增加）实现承诺的货币政策结果，将Walsh(1995)的结论扩展到实际变量存在持续性的情形。
This paper shows that, if unemployment (or some other real variable) follows a dynamic autoregressive process, the government can still achieve its precommitment outcome in monetary policy by offering the central banker a linear inflation contract, where the penalty for incremental inflation depends positively on lagged unemployment. This note, therefore, offers an extension of recent results of C. Walsh (1995) to the case of persistence in real economic variables such as output or unemployment. Copyright 1997 by Ohio State University Press.