The Core Matchings of Markets with Transfers
研究了带转移支付的双方市场中核心匹配集合的结构，发现该集合满足一致性性质，且一致性是判定某匹配集合能否由某个分配游戏产生的充要条件。
We characterize the structure of the set of core matchings of an assignment game (a two-sided market with transfers). Such a set satisfies a property we call consistency. Consistency of a set of matchings states that, for any matching ν, if, for each agent i there exists a matching μ in the set for which μ there μ(i) = ν (i), then ν is in the set. A set of matchings satisfies consistency if and only if there is an assignment game for which all elements of the set maximize the surplus.