Debt Contracts with Partial Commitment
研究了借款人无法被强制还款时，贷款人提供不完全执行且可重新谈判的长期合同，发现执行程度提高可能降低社会福利，且部分承诺下的投资动态与现金流的正相关关系符合实证。
This paper analyzes a dynamic lending relationship where the borrower cannot be forced to make repayments, and the lender offers long-term contracts that are imperfectly enforced and repeatedly renegotiated. No commitment and full commitment by the lender are special cases of this model where the probability of enforcement equals zero and one, respectively. I show that an increase in the degree of enforcement can lower social welfare. Furthermore, properties of equilibrium investment dynamics with partial commitment drastically differ from those with full and no commitment. In particular, investment is positively related to cash flow, consistent with empirical findings.