You are Known by the Directors You Keep: Reputable Directors as a Signaling Mechanism for Young Firms
构建了外部董事信号作用的分析模型，证明高质量新创企业可通过任命声誉良好的董事向利益相关者传递可信信号，但该策略受董事声誉和信息质量限制，且信息不完全时好坏企业可共存。
In this paper, we develop an analytical model of outside directors' signaling role—a role that is especially important for entrepreneurial firms. We formally demonstrate that in the face of a market failure in which stakeholders refuse to align themselves with new firms, high-quality new ventures may be able to credibly signal their type by appointing reputable directors to their boards. However, this option is not universally feasible. Both directors' reputations and the quality of their information determine the effectiveness of this strategy. In contrast to earlier adverse selection models, we demonstrate that when the middlemen (directors) have incomplete information on firm quality, bad and good firms can coexist in equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the quality of the directors' information determines the mix of good and bad firms in the population of surviving firms. Avenues for future research and normative implications for practitioners are discussed.