Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade‐Off between Liquidity and Control?
分析大股东监督上市公司的激励，发现股票市场流动性虽让大股东更易卖出股票，但也降低了持有大额股份的成本，从而缓解小股东搭便车问题，使公司治理更有效。
This paper analyzes the incentives of large shareholders to monitor public corporations. We investigate the hypothesis that a liquid stock market reduces large shareholders' incentives to monitor because it allows them to sell their stocks more easily. Even though this is true, a liquid market also makes it less costly to hold larger stakes and easier to purchase additional shares. We show that this fact is important if monitoring is costly: market liquidity mitigates the problem that small shareholders free ride on the effort of the large shareholder. We find that liquid stock markets are beneficial because they make corporate governance more effective.