Accounting Information in Private Markets: Evidence from Private Lending Agreements.
研究私人贷款协议中协商的会计计量规则，发现其与公认会计准则存在系统性差异，且差异反映了借贷双方的经济激励，对自愿选择会计规则、替代规则优劣及多样化规则需求有启示。
Abstract ABSTRACT: This paper contains evidence of accounting measurement rules that are negotiated in private corporate lending agreements. The negotiated sets of rules differ from the regulated set of accounting rules (generally accepted accounting principles). Moreover, the differences between regulated and negotiated rules are systematic and consistent with the economic incentives of borrowers and lenders. Private parties in the market for accounting information are able to produce for themselves at least some of the information required for monitoring lending agreements. The evidence and analysis have implications for: 1. The voluntary choice of accounting rules, 2. The superiority of alternative accounting rules, and 3. The demand for a diverse set of accounting rules.