Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
通过实验研究平均意见博弈中决策者如何选择均衡，发现收益主导、安全性和历史先例影响选择，行为系统可预测，为构建均衡选择理论提供依据。
Deductive equilibrium analysis often fails to provide a unique equilibrium solution in many situations of strategic interdependence. Consequently, a theory of equilibrium selection would be a useful complement to the theory of equilibrium points. A salient equilibrium selection principle would allow decision makers to implement a mutual best response outcome. This paper uses the experimental method to examine the salience of payoff-dominance, security, and historical precedents in related average opinion games. The systematic and, hence, predictable behavior observed in the experiments suggests that it should be possible to construct an accurate theory of equilibrium selection.