Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of Competitive Arms Accumulation
证明，当国家能监控对手武器库存时，子博弈完美纳什均衡比标准开环纳什均衡带来更低的军备水平和更高的福利，基于一个竞争性军备积累模型。
This paper shows that the subgame-perfect Nash strategic equilibrium, which is relevant when countries can monitor their rival's weapon stock, leads to lower levels of arms and higher welfare than the standard open-loop Nash strategic equilibrium for an arms race. This result is derived for a model of competitive arms accumulation, in which two countries face a classic guns versus butter dilemma in the form of utilities which depend on consumption, leisure and the characteristic defence. Moreover, it is argued that the perfect equilibrium strategies lead to a more satisfactory strategic underpinning of the well-known Richardson equations.