Are Board Members Pawns or Watchdogs?
研究从管理权力和董事会监督两个对立视角分析CEO薪酬与企业绩效的关系，发现董事会监督视角得到支持，即董事会能有效将CEO薪酬与绩效挂钩。
This study examines the CEO pay and firm performance link from two competing perspectives managerial power and board vigilance. From the managerial power perspective, a powerful CEO dominates the board and decouples the pay-performance link. In contrast, board vigilance maintains that boards represent shareholder interests by effectively tying the CEO's pay to firm performance. Consistent with the board vigilance perspective, the link was stronger when CEOs were older or longer tenured and when more committee members had CEO experience. The authors found no support for the managerial power perspective.