On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests
分析政治竞争模型中政治家向特殊利益转移的形式，发现当选民对政策效果和政客倾向信息不完全时，低效的再分配方式可能被采用。
An important question in political economy concerns the form of transfers to special interests. The Chicago view is that political competition leads politicians to make such transfers efficiently. The Virginia position is that lack of information on the part of voters leads politicians to favor inefficient 'sneaky' methods of redistribution. This paper analyzes the form of transfers in a model of political competition in which politicians have incentives to make transfers to special interests. It shows that, when voters have imperfect information about both the effects of policy and the predisposition of politicians, inefficient methods of redistribution may be employed. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press.