Free‐Riding and Intergovernmental Grants
论证将政府间转移支付与公平和效率目标挂钩意味着政府非理性，提出支出集中度与收入集中度独立决定，当支出集中度小于收入集中度时需转移支付来平衡预算，并强调下级政府对转移支付的“需求”会引发代理问题，可通过附加条件解决。
This paper argues that to associate intergovernmental grants with the objectives of equity and efficiency implies that governments are irrational. The authors find long-term systematic irrationality in the behavior of any institution difficult to accept. The authors, therefore, propose that the factors which determine expenditure concentration in governmental systems are different and independent of the factors that control revenue concentration, so that the two will, in general, be different. When expenditure concentration is smaller than revenue concentration, budgetary balance will require intergovernmental grants. The authors stress that the "demand" for grants originates with junior governments and that it creates a standard agency problem which can be remedied by making intergovernmental grants conditional. Copyright 1992 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG