Who Wants an Independent Central Bank? Monetary Policy‐making and Politics
在党派商业周期模型中分析合作性货币与财政政策的成本收益，发现不同意识形态的政党偏好不同的宏观经济政策安排，右翼政党比左翼更支持独立央行，且独立央行从社会福利角度看更优。
The costs and benefits of cooperative monetary and fiscal policy are analysed in the framework of a partisan business‐cycles model. It is shown that political parties with different ideologies prefer to choose different arrangements for macroeconomic policy‐making. More specifically, right‐wing parties favour independent central banks more than left‐wing parties. An independent central bank is also the generally preferred option from a social welfare point of view. In addition, the form of policy‐making arrangements between the fiscal and monetary authorities is shown to influence the extent of partisan cycles.