IMPORTING CREDIBILITY THROUGH EXCHANGE RATE PEGGING*
用最优税收框架研究开放经济中货币政策可信度，发现钉住汇率能通过完美监控引入可信度，实现最优声誉均衡，即使当局保留意外贬值权。
This paper employs an optimal taxation framework in order to study the credibility of monetary policy-making in an open economy. Since inflation is, in part, uncontrollable due to stochastic disturbances, the authority's actions cannot be monitored perfectly when the exchange rate floats, thus implying that reputational forces may become ineffective. In contrast, pegging the nominal exchange rate to a low-inflation currency allows perfect monitoring, because the exchange rate is, in principle, controllable. For this reason, exchange rate pegging may import credibility and result in the best reputational equilibrium, even though the authority retains the discretion to devalue unexpectedly.