Learning and communication in sender‐receiver games: an econometric investigation
利用发送者-接收者博弈实验数据，比较刺激反应和信念学习两种模型，发现刺激反应模型在无群体历史或偏好冲突时表现更好，对研究博弈学习理论的学者有参考价值。
Abstract This paper compares stimulus response (SR) and belief‐based learning (BBL) using data from experiments with sender–receiver games. The environment, extensive form games played in a population setting, is novel in the empirical literature on learning in games. Both the SR and BBL models fit the data reasonably well in games where the preferences of senders and receivers are perfectly aligned and where the population history of the senders is known. The test results accept SR and reject BBL in games without population history and in all but one of the games where senders and receivers have different preferences over equilibria. Estimation is challenging since the likelihood function is not globally concave and the data become uninformative about learning once equilibrium is achieved. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.