Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions
研究拍卖中分配效率与信息聚合之间的张力，分析当未知质量的同质物品拍卖给受品味影响的竞拍者时，在极限条件下物品能否有效分配给品味最高者，以及价格是否收敛于边际品味类型的价值。
The tension between allocative efficiency and information aggregation is explored in the context of an auction: k identical objects of unknown quality are auctioned off to n bidders whose tastes affect their valuation of an object of given quality. Bidders receive a signal about the quality of the objects. The k highest bidders get an object and pay a price equal to the k + 1st highest bid. We find conditions under which, in the limit, objects are allocated efficiently to those with the highest tastes, and price converges in probability to the value of an object to the marginal taste type.