Is Subsidizing Inefficient Bidders Actually Costly?
研究政府采购中补贴弱势竞标者的效果，发现补贴低效竞标者反而可能降低项目预期成本并提高经济效率，对政策制定者和拍卖设计者有参考价值。
A widespread practice, particularly in public-sector procurement and dispersal, is to subsidize a class of competitors believed to be at an economic disadvantage. Arguments for such policies vary, but they typically assume that benefits of subsidization must be large enough to outweigh a presumed economic cost of the subsidy. When disadvantaged competitors compete in auctions, the subsidy serves to make them more competitive rivals. Other bidders rationally respond by bidding more aggressively. We consider a model of procurement auctions and show that a policy of subsidizing inefficient competitors can lower expected project cost and also enhance economic efficiency. Some subsidy is generally better than no subsidy for a wide range of parameters.