Incentive Alignment, Control, and the Issue of Misleading Financial Disclosures
研究了1994-2003年间，激励对齐与控制机制如何影响公司发布误导性财务披露，发现高管持股和或有薪酬与财务重述正相关，但业绩和董事会特征会调节这一关系。
The accounting scandals of recent years have raised concerns about the efficacy of incentive alignment and control systems. Among matched firms that either did or did not restate misleading financial disclosures during the period 1994-2003, both managerial equity ownership and contingent compensation were positively related to restatements when considered independently of other factors such as firm performance and board characteristics. When these variables were introduced, performance positively moderated the relationship between ownership and restatements, although contingent compensation was no longer significant. Finally, misleading disclosures were less prevalent in firms whose boards had high levels of business experience and long tenure.