Limited Rationality and Strategic Complements: The Implications for Macroeconomics
研究信息处理能力异质性对具有战略互补特征的宏观经济模型的影响，发现当存在战略互补时，天真（naive）的代理人比老练（sophisticated）的代理人对宏观经济均衡有更大的影响。
This paper considers the implications of heterogeneity in information-processing abilities for macroeconomic models that exhibit "strategic complements." The latter is the same concept that has received much attention in the recent macro literature under the headings Keynesian coordination problems and positive trading externalities. We consider environments in which agents vary in terms of their ability to form expectations, and ask whether it is the "sophisticated" agents or the "naive" agents who have a disproportionately large effect on macroeconomic equilibrium. We find that if macroeconomic interaction exhibits strategic complementarity, then it is the naive agents who have a disproportionate impact.