赢得与失去汇率承诺可信度:英国案例

Gaining and Losing Erm Credibility: The Case of the United Kingdom

Economic Journal · 1995
被引 73
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

模型强调可信度的两个方面:政府类型信号和被迫贬值可能性,并分析失业与利率差异的关系,对研究汇率承诺可信度的学者有参考价值。

Abstract

The model of this paper highlights two aspects of credibility: signalling the type of government, which is assumed not to be known; and, for any type, the likelihood that if circumstances are sufficiently unfavourable a devaluation will be impossible to avoid, since not to do so would go against the government's interests. These two factors have opposite implications for the link between unemployment and interest differentials: high unemployment signals a tough government, but also makes it less likely that even a tough government will maintain an existing parity.

政府类型信号失业与利差汇率制度可信度